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NEW WORLD ORDER: RESTORATION OR MORAL REVOLUTION?

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Abstract. The ongoing turbulence in global politics has been accompanied by calls to shift the current order of international relations from a rules-based world towards a multipolar system rooted in international law. Political leaders and commentators, primarily of Russian origin, have often referred to those initiatives as a moral revolution in the current world order. This paper examines the theological and philosophical background behind the ideas that support such a change. The discussion argues that these proposals, though they sound revolutionary, echo the Abrahamic principles of international dialogue drafted by medieval Christian theologians, Reformation thinkers, and Jewish and Islamic religious philosophers. The account stresses that contemporary adherents of the replacement of the rules-based world do not openly refer to religious doctrines. However, the core tenets of the suggested reforms align well with those earlier ethical principles. This conclusion is purely scholarly and contributes to the history of ideas.

Keywords: world order, moral revolution, globalism, regionalism, Russia, the West, religion, balance of forces, rules-based world, Abrahamic theology.

INTRODUCTION

During the past few decades, two major forces, namely globalists and regionalists, have determined the evolution of world politics. In the first case, political and intellectual circles representing multinational financial and big-tech corporations aspired to claim almost universal jurisdiction. These groups stood behind the universalization or globalization of the planet. Such actors strove to attain control over the global markets and insisted, as a result, on economic integration and the technological unification of states. In the second case, nationally oriented political elites of Western and non-Western states, as well as some academics and intellectuals, adhered to value pluralism and opposed the former cohort. They advanced the ideas of civilizational polarisation and geopolitical regionalization. Their critical inquiry into the existing world politics assumed that polycentrism and multipolarity could give viable answers to the plethora of present challenges. Hence, the desire for absolute power expressed by the advocates of the globalist approach clashed with the critical inquiry into the structure of the extant world order pursued by nationalist and regionalist actors. By the end of 2021, the world was in conflict on territorial and ideological grounds, as the ambitions of both groups to advance their respective causes grew. Significantly, civilizationists insisted that their plans for reconstructing the world order could be viewed as a moral revolution in international affairs.

The present essay examines grievances expressed by the regionalist cohort and scrutinizes their ethical plans for reshuffling the current system of international dialogue.

On a purely intellectual plane, the discussion argues that reforms offered by such states outside the West, and their nationally oriented counterparts within the West, do not call for a drastically new model of a global society. Instead, their proposals refer to the historical tradition of grounding international morality in Abrahamic ethical-theological principles. Despite the claims of a revolution in the world order, the vector of this group's axiological critique is geared towards restoring the historical paradigm rooted in the law of nations that was written and articulated during the Reformation.

This finding has a purely intellectual value, and we do not draw any practical conclusions from it. Nevertheless, this hypothesis might provide a thought-provoking addition to intellectual history and its application to current affairs. This paper is in three parts. The first section deals with the scope of moral and ethical issues raised by the protagonists of the new order. The second part analyses the Abrahamic theological underpinning of their plans. The final section illustrates those theoretical findings.

CENTRAL PLANS AND QUESTIONS

The gradual unravelling of the existing international-relations construction (i.e. the hegemony of the Western world led by the United States) has been animated by a profound moral transformation that has inundated Western and non-Western societies over the past few decades. The industrial rise of the non-Western realm, led by the BRICS countries, has given those states the strength and the sense of independence to conduct a free political inquiry into the existing global arrangement. This moral sentiment was consummated by the quest for equity and reciprocity among the existing cultures and the desire for meaningful and mutually beneficial dialogue among nations. Ensuring the stability of treaties has become an overarching objective of the plan for reconstituting the IR framework. Many formerly unquestioned subjects, such as the position of the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency and the possibility of creating a world based on multiple value systems, have also stimulated reappraisal.

A further deluge of questions has encompassed religious morals and their role in modern society; the relationship between the individual and culture/civilization; the nature of international hierarchy; composition and governance within the supra-national economic, financial, societal, and other administrative institutions; and global leadership and hegemony. All these issues entered the arena of discourse and became the object of study, doubt, and systemic criticism. Had this moral sentiment not surfaced, the world must have been abandoned to purely material and economic forces that would pull all countries and peoples into an all-encompassing westernization of lives and cultures.

As a result, the quest for absolute power of the technological and financial groups of the Western world collided with the desire for liberty of non-Western states and nationally oriented political groups within the West. Liberty was required by all who questioned the actions of the hegemon and demanded equality in global decision-making. At the practical level, those proposals and requests encompassed the following narrative: demands for the primacy of law in international transactions; claims against the ability of one country to rule the world; assurance of the liberty to practise one's religion in one's land, thus emphasizing the multiplicity of cultural and religious paradigms; and the striving for peace and dialogue derived from the mutuality and reciprocity of the involved parties. We shall return to the practical illustration of these claims in the third part of this paper.

It is essential to add that every fundamental change in the universal redistribution of power, property, and capital, and every reconstruction of the ruling system, requires

an initial imposition by force. The new rules are usually asserted with some physical strife and via some form of serious conflict. Lasting peace ensues from each ferocious battle until the new configuration of power and control over resources degenerates and gives way to the next paradigm. For example, the Yalta-Potsdam system was enacted following the Second World War, and the Holy Alliance fell, along with Russia's undisputed confidence in European affairs, at the time of the Crimean War [Taylor 1954: 62-82]. Furthermore, AJP Taylor [ibid.: xxi] argues that Europe wished to substitute the balance-of-power system, which was stabilised through both anarchy and the Great Power concert, for hegemony that could delegate the leadership over the continent's affairs to a single centre. However, the balance of power did not fully end until 1918, following the end of the First World War, when Wilson proclaimed his Fourteen Points and the Bolsheviks appealed for revolutionary peace.

Returning to the current situation (winter 2022), before Russia's official request to the West to provide military and security guarantees, sent on 11 December 2021 and seeking to reorganize international architecture in Europe, the aforementioned ethical inquiries were divorced from practical politics and remained a matter of academic debate. Apart from attempts to establish conventional institutions of non-Western inter-regional cooperation, such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, the desire for multipolarity did not produce meaningful, practical action. However, December 2021 was a break point that heralded a cardinal challenge to the existing political, military, diplomatic, trade, and financial arrangements.

From this point, a purely intellectual inquiry into the structure of world design began to take on a functional shape. Many non-Western countries were eager to reshuffle the rules that had been set by the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have become keen to secure a more significant role for their states across the whole spectrum of global institutions and to create a system in which they will be actively involved in drafting positive international law. Equally, politicians of leading non-Western nations, such as China, India, and Russia, often assert that the principles of universal fairness have been vitiated by global hegemony, and these principles must be revived if humanity is to evolve peacefully. The protagonists of this change have often viewed their actions as a moral revolution because they aim to elevate the architecture of international relations onto a new ethical basis.

THEOLOGICAL PARALLELS AND FOUNDATIONS

This paper suggests that the agents, which initiated the free inquiry into the international hierarchy and invoked the discussions on post-hegemonic designs, did not offer entirely novel or revolutionary positions. Instead, they inadvertently pressed for the reconstitution of the *Abrahamic* approach to international society, which has inspired diplomatists over the past five hundred years. Undoubtedly, it would not be accurate to insist that contemporary leaders and public opinion makers of the nationalist cohort consciously deployed or ever referred to any aspects of Abrahamic theology in their treatment of IR. Nevertheless, many legal theological notions of the past have in fact resurfaced in today's political, diplomatic, and military debates. From this point of view, the counter-hegemonic international ideals could be regarded as an inadvertent reproduction of the enlightened justice of the European Reformation. Indeed, the precepts of the former offer a mere reinstatement of the early principles of the original law of nations.

This situation is quite logical. Much of modern international law bears the stamp of European Christian civilization, and its theological origins are rooted in the

Reformation, when the initial contours of contemporary international relations were formed [Oppenheim 1955; George 1999b; Kennedy 1999; Rosenne 1999; Stackhouse 1998; Skinner 2002]. Brown Scott [1934: 60, 127], tracing the evolution of the law of nations, contends that 'a Christendom, broken by the Reformation, was replaced by an international community ... universal and embracing by all peoples of all continents; the law applicable to the Christian community was found to be applicable [to] non-Christians; and the law of nations, once confined to Christendom, has become international.' Furthermore, during the Medieval period, the conception of international law and morality was conceived as part of the discipline of theology under the influence of St. Augustine and the Church Fathers. This approach was followed by the Catholic writers of Spain and consolidated in the work of the Reformation thinkers.

It is fair to mention that the social and political institutions erected on the foundations of biblical themes have been readjusted systematically, especially during the colonial past, and that international law has increasingly distanced itself from the theological discourse over the past three hundred years [George 1999a: 606]. Nevertheless, the theological foundations have always provided humanity with a moral and ethical benchmark [Berger 1999: 3-4]. As Novak [Novak 1998: 185] notes, 'religious traditions can be seen as cultural matrices out of which reason slowly develops. If this is the case, then these traditions can be taken as historical sources that cannot be ignored because all rational attempts, in the case at hand, the rational attempts to constitute an international society, are themselves historically located and do not, therefore, spring up *de novo*.' Kennedy [Kennedy 1999: 151] supports this opinion by insisting that in order to focus on the evolution of legal culture, we ought to 'begin with religion, seeing the roots of law's arrogance, universality, indeed univocality, in the project of canon law and the development of catholicity.'

Looking at the problem from a wider angle, we maintain that the newly proposed contours of the post-hegemonic world embrace not only a Christian but an overwhelmingly Scriptural character, due to a highly complex, intimate, and closely intertwined relationship between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam [Novak 1998; Hashimi 1998; Stackhouse 1998; Kennedy 1999]. Significantly, some Christian theologians of IR made generous use of the Old Testament and overtly relied on Hebrew texts and principles, thus constructing an overarching Abrahamic framework for their thought. The works of Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), Hugo Grotius (1538-1645), and John Selden (1584-1654) are just a few such brilliant examples of the interweaving of Jewish and Christian theological theories of international conduct [Rosenne 1999: 66; Novak 1989]. In this light, it would seem relevant to examine a few central Scriptural concepts that apply directly to recent proposals for the reconstruction of the international order.

The first concept focuses on the centrality of law in international relations. Many early-modern Christian philosophers, such as Vittoria (1480-1546), Suarez (1548-1617), Ayala (1543-1612), Molina (1535-1600), and Grotius (1583-1645) stressed this point. The same could be said of the Jewish and Islamic theologians who endeavoured to regulate the relationship of scriptural people with representatives of other faiths and cultures. Of course, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam diverged in their judgment of the distance between Revelation and reason in the legal regulation of human affairs. Nevertheless, the point that united the three religious threads was the unique combination of law and morality, amalgamating both categories into one unit.

Christian theologians, who played the most prominent role in forming contemporary international society, drew a direct link between the Scriptures and international

law [Brown Scott 1934]. The main feature of the Christian methodology is that it embraced a multi-tiered approach to law and constructed an observable distance between God's law and human legislation. Christian thinkers departed from the idea that all law falls into four categories: divine, Revealed, natural, and positive. Positive law, or legislation, belongs to the sphere of human invention, a law created by humans to advance peace and harmony within their communities. At the same time, positive law is indelibly linked to and erected upon the foundations of natural, Revealed, and divine laws [Doyle 1999: 105; Dante 2000; George 1999a]. Following this logic, Reformist theologians argued their principal point that the law of nations is part of positive human law and not a divine or natural one [Skinner 2002: 152-153; Doyle 1999: 106-107; George 1999b; Brown Scott 1934].

Casting international law into a positive category had profound moral implications. This step meant that international society had no natural or divine inclinations toward upholding any form of natural hierarchy or justifying the submission of weaker peoples to stronger ones. Hence, this legal method created a system of checks and balances derived from the reason and common sense of the members of the international community. Vitoria claimed that this law is made 'by the whole world's authority', which ensures that there are 'just and convenient rules for everyone in it' [Skinner 2002: 154; Brown Scott 1934: 16, 59]. Suarez mirrored this opinion by stating that the law of nations has a character of positive law established by the customs of all or *almost* all nations [Doyle 1999: 197]. Hence, concepts of international law and equality emerged from the Reformist Christian approach to the world order.

The Islamic tradition, another strand of the Abrahamic faith, also defends the primacy of law in domestic and international society. While the explicit separation between positive and natural aspects is lacking, it is said that God's commandments, hence His law, constitute the core of behaviour in every sphere of human activity. From this point of view, domestic and international law originate from divine instruction. If we apply the logic of positive and natural law division, the Qur'an leaves the possibility for moral judgement based on reason, because it allows for the existence of unbelievers.

Hence the Qur'an envisions the human race consisting of good believers 'as well as bad believers and unbelievers, each to be "brought back to God"' [Hashmi 1998: 220]. In this light, the Islamic IR structure assumes peaceful coexistence between Islamic and non-Islamic, albeit Scriptural, communities under Islamic law. This configuration allows for diplomacy and treaties, trade, travel, commerce, and rules of war. It also encompasses a truce with pagans, which it allows to be extended for ten years.

This position also works well with the Jewish theological perception of the primacy of law for the proper ordering of the globe. However, the most striking feature, which distinguishes the Jewish approach to international society from Christian and Muslim thinking, is that Jewish scholarship makes it impossible to separate any law from morality or religion in general. Jewish law makes no distinction between the spiritual and the secular; in the Jewish mind, both aspects of life have an equally divine origin and aim to achieve God's will [Rosenne 1999: 83].

We may therefore argue that the fundamental Jewish contribution to international affairs lies in creating a solid link between law and *morality*. In Book 1, Treatise V, of his code, Maimonides stressed that each state has a moral value, because each has virtues and failings. That state whose virtues exceed its failings is righteous, and vice versa [Ch. III, 1; Rosenne 1999: 83-84]. This position points out that, for Judaism, any discussion on international society must take place in a decidedly legal context based on

the Revelation, which is open to some interpretation when applied to the international landscape [Novak 1998: 190]. Therefore, a Jewish view on organizing a world society would have to be seen primarily in achieving a legally constituted system [Pelikan 2006].

The second moral position shared by the three Abrahamic strands precludes any one country from ruling the world alone. According to Christian legal philosophy, all power is based on public consent, because authority comes from God through the people. However, it is impossible to secure such consent worldwide, due to the vast differences in living religions and cultures. Therefore, the fathers of the 'law of nations' stated that countries with different values and beliefs must 'without a doubt be able to have true dominion because the law of nature is written for all human minds and hearts equally' [Skinner 2002: 168-169; Brown Scott 1934: 14-15].

Furthermore, Scholastic thinkers – Thomists, Jesuits, Dominicans, and Conciliarists – advocated the principle of freedom of social development within each Kingdom in the international realm. Significantly, these theologists insisted that state rulers have responsibilities to each other not to interfere in matters of faith within different countries and to allow them to practise a religion of their choice. The Latin proclamation of this principle stated: *cuio regio, egio religio*, translated as 'whose reign, his religion' [Skinner 2002: 196]. This notion later fed into the Westphalian system of international relations.

At the same time, princes had a legal obligation to each other not to be in a hierarchical relationship – a practice often promoted now, albeit in a contemporary interpretation. This philosophical and legal notion imposed limitations on the power of the temporal state. In his 'law of nations', Suarez argues that, while each state is 'supreme in its order', none has an unconditional right to trespass upon another [Doyle 1999: 105-106]. He also stressed that states could wage wars against each other in a restricted set of circumstances derived from their specific bilateral relationships, but no nation has the right to police the world and guide those mutual transactions [ibid.: 111]. Such an idea was also enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The Islamic approach to international society has parallels with this position. For example, Islam allows the existence of unbelievers as part of God's plan for humanity. Along with this, various non-Islamic societies may practise their religions and political systems, at the same time allowing the Muslim community residing within those countries to practise their religion and to worship freely. Similar Jewish principles are articulated in Deuteronomy [Pelikan 2006].

The third point accentuates the primacy of international peace and dialogue. Jewish theology emphasizes the active pursuit of peace. Indeed, the core biblical task is one of 'beating swords into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks' (Isaiah 2:4). These verses provided an intellectual, moral, and legal basis for international efforts to achieve peace, and they are engraved upon the United Nations Headquarters in New York [Rosenne 1999: 82].

Christianity summarises its search for peace in the concept of the Kingdom of God, the *regnum*. The Kingdom of God may be found in the Church, in Christ himself, in the living religions, and in the *regnum* [Schmidt 1965: 574; Ratzinger 2007: 52; Berger 1999: 34-35]. The *regnum-centric* interpretation, which became dominant in the Christian circles the second half of the twentieth century, relies on the centrality of the Kingdom itself. The Kingdom has been understood as a 'world governed by peace, justice, and the conservation of creation' [Ratzinger 2007: 53-54].

Equally, another core Christian principle of social life derives from the separation between Christ and Caesar, patriarch and czar, *sacredotium* and *emporium*. This prin-

ciple implies that religious membership cannot be the basis for social membership, thus simultaneously assuring freedom of religion and obedience to the principles of justice. As Paul taught, those regimes that are constituted on godly principles could be discerned according to ethical criteria [Stackhouse 1998: 205]. In other words, God is the foundation of all knowledge and makes the dialogue between different religions and non-believers possible. He also establishes the laws under which such a dialogue can be debated, codified, and reasoned.

Finally, Western thought of late modernity applied those moral positions to the criticism of absolute power. Leading nineteenth-century thinkers, for example, warned against the dangers of absolute power, its unsurmountable evil in whatever form, whatever name it may bear. Guizot [1997: 270] maintained that the 'human mind, possessed of absolute power, became corrupted and misled by it, holding established facts and former ideas in an illegitimate disdain and aversion; an aversion which carried it into error and tyranny.' Many non-Western players, as well as some critical voices within the West, perceive that the hegemonic ambitions of the United States and its faith in the benevolence of its global political role, including the promotion of democracy in other countries, may result in such unlimited power [Darden 2017; Stuenkel 2016; Higgott 2019; Lieven, Hulsman 2006; Kaplan 2006]. Having said that, the international hierarchy has begun to decay during the past few decades due to the rise of new powers which have worked to challenge the global leadership of the United States [Acharya 2014; Brooks, Wohlforth 2008; Cocker 2019; Chandra 2018]. A contemporary moral revision of international rules is also taking place because the concern about the possibility of certain countries to accumulate absolute power has been growing for decades without meeting a proper political expression. Leaders of non-Western states have been spectators who silently observed, judged, and pondered the existing state of affairs. Organisations of mutual co-operation of such states BRICS, Shanghai Organisation of Co-operation and others did not move far beyond debates, discussions, and declarations of intentions. Finally, however, the critical mass of these thoughts, wishes, and inclinations has begun to meet with practical action in the fields of international finance, payments, and reactions to the military, political, and economic demands of the hegemon.

PRACTICAL POLITICAL POSITIONS

As we have already observed, the advocates of the new world order have deployed the ideational features of Abrahamic theology, although they have not explicitly cited those theological concepts in speeches and writings – except perhaps for Vladimir Putin's occasional use of Russian Orthodox Christian philosophy[1]. Nevertheless, the inquiring cohort of non-Western states, and some political and intellectual circles within the West, have echoed those early theological principles de facto and, by doing so, have attempted to regenerate the pre-existing international legal precepts adopted and promulgated by the modern law of nations. As a result, many originally Western values of early modernity influenced by the Reformation have been inadvertently appropriated and internalized by international actors sceptical of Western hegemony. A few examples are in order.

First, official criticism was directed against the contemporary Western idea of a 'rules-based' world in which many weaker countries were expected to follow these rules, although they played no part in their drafting. It has become a common perception among inquiring states that such rules were applied selectively, to the benefit

[1] Refer to Vladimir Putin's numerous addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, in which he cites various Russian philosophers.

of the strongest players. The fact that all practices were subject to arbitrary change by the most influential parties exacerbated the situation. The primacy of law and a critique of the rules-based world has been Russia's main focus in the country's ideological debates with the Western protagonists of this system. Russia's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, has held that Western countries are developing rules without the consent of the rest of the international community and are both undermining and circumventing the United Nations. At a joint press conference with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on 26 April 2022, Lavrov explained: "We consider developing certain 'rules' behind the back of the greater part of the international community and then imposing them on others as universal norms, an unacceptable and dangerous practice. The 'rules-based order' concept promoted by our Western colleagues is unrelated to either law or universal morality" [2]. Chinese diplomacy was also outspoken about the need to create a fair system of international relations based on the law, applicable to all participants of the worldwide dialogue. In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping often criticized the abuse of unilateral Western sanctions[3].

An academic critique of the rules-based world has also surfaced in the West. The English School of international relations insists that the planet is divided into rich industrialized states that determine the parameters of interactive practice and peripheral poorer areas that must follow established rules [Suganami 2010; Buzan, Lawson 2015; Buzan 2011]. The English School thinkers [Manning 1975: 177, 201; Bull 2000: 252; James 1986] have claimed that these unwritten rules favour industrially developed countries because the contemporary international dialogue is closely intertwined with the proliferation of social communication in the economic sphere. At the same time, the regular system of trade, commerce, and finance is sustained via international institutions and non-state and non-territorial actors that establish practices of social interaction.

The wealthier Western states dominate all such outlets. In this system, the claims for hierarchy have represented social norms of behaviour in the international arena that benefited the most powerful and industrially developed nations. In particular, American hegemony was a corollary of the web of Western technological superiority, military power, and global institutions of financial control. Above all, this hegemony was nourished by the socially constructed perception of international hierarchy, which consisted of the privileged group of 'club' countries and the less privileged 'rest of the world'.

Second, champions of the perceived moral revolution rebelled against the idea that the West is privy to the omnipotent and ubiquitous truth, and therefore has the right to propagate its values in the rest of the globe. The new gamut of Western concepts has invoked scepticism and suspicion. These have concerned the new attitudes towards human anthropology, ecology, green energy, family life, labour, gender relations, and the boundaries of religious and moral tolerance. In response, many non-Western parts of the planet have declared their intentions to adhere to their base value frameworks and not to follow post-modern ideational transformations [Berger 1999: 7-8]. These actors emphasized the importance of the plurality of cultures and developmental models in line with the precepts of the law of nations discussed earlier. The main argument was that stable development is achieved when no trends or tendencies

[2] Lavrov S. Joint press conference with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*, 26.04.2022. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1810897/ (accessed 12.03.2023).

[3] Faulconbridge, G. China's Xi criticises sanctions "abuse", Putin scolds the West. *Reuters*, 23.06.2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-criticises-sanctions-abuse-putin-scolds-west-2022-06-23/ (accessed 12.03.2023).

can prevail and dominate. Indeed, if various principles and powers mingle and limit each other, struggle and debate without ceasing, and no faction can predominate and win entirely, stability and progress may be achieved. For example, Mohammad Bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, argued that people of the globe have different views and cultures, and the attempts of the United States to impose its values on the rest of humanity by force are counterproductive (16 July 2022).

Third, inquiring states insist on equity, parity, and reciprocity in international relations, which could expedite global peace. As we maintained above, such claims resemble the early-modern European ideas that brought about contemporary Western civilization and ensured its global success. This notion also harks back to the early-modern thinkers who declared that one state could not rule the world alone. On the diplomatic front, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other states became supportive of multipolarity and the idea of an equitable redistribution of global power. This development was seen in the broadening of non-Western institutions of international cooperation. For example, at its June 2022 summit the BRICS organization formally announced an expansion by scheduling the incorporation of Iran and Argentina.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia also shared their hopes of joining BRICS in the summer of 2022. On top of this, Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in accessing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Likewise, Turkey, a powerful bidder for the multipolar world leadership, began to pose inconvenient questions and create awkward dilemmas for the West. For example, the country failed to join U.S.-led sanctions on Russia, stalled the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, negotiated bilateral trade with Russia in national currencies, and joined Russia's national payment system, MIR. Furthermore, the July 2022 summit between the leaders of Russia, Turkey, and Iran opened a new page in international relations by paving the way for a new political and trade area comprising nearly three hundred million people.

Finally, steps for achieving equitable relationships in global finance became the chief practical tool in reformatting the world order. The emergence of new currency zones and the expansion of dollar-free trade facilitated the restructuring of international dialogue. Indeed, control over global finance by one country grants unrivalled privileges to that state, allows the weaponization of finance, and turns the reserve currency holder into the world's gendarme. The U.S. sanctions on Russia inspired many countries to speed up their search for alternative currencies in their trade relations. India and China supported the idea of dollar-free transactions in their energy dealings with Russia and joined Russia's national version of the SWIFT system to facilitate the process. Central banks from Asia to the Middle East are setting up bilateral currency swap lines to reduce dependence on the dollar[4]. The International Monetary Fund suggests that currency blocs that calculate their value based on their participants' material and industrial resources represent the next possible step for reserve currency reconstruction[5].

Conclusion

The world is undergoing a significant reconstitution – occasionally called a 'moral revolution'. The goals of this process could be seen as achieving a new, just, and fair architecture of international dialogue. This paper explored the moral foundations of

[4] Sharma, R. A post-dollar world is coming. The currency may look strong but its weaknesses are mounting. *Financial Times*, 28.08.2022.

[5] Wheately, J. Russia sanctions threaten to dilute dominance of U.S. dollar, says IMF official. *Financial Times*, 04.04.2022.

the newly evolving order and found that the proposed changes are not revolutionary, but strongly resemble the ideas expressed in the law of nations conceived around the Reformation era. This essay pondered cornerstone theological conceptions of that period. It concluded that the primacy of law instead of rules, the equality of cultures, the multiplicity of political systems, and the flight from hierarchical perceptions of dialogue belong to the Abrahamic philosophy of the past. The fact that contemporary politicians of emerging nations are reinventing those aspects in their proposals to restructure global politics is exciting and intellectually engaging. Whether the reformed tradition is capable of a triumphant comeback or will eventually give way to the rules-based world supported by a globalized secular elite hinges upon the political and economic success and moral determination of the non-Western, and revisionist Western, world. The outcome is of utmost importance for the future of international affairs.

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НОВЫЙ МИРОВОЙ ПОРЯДОК: РЕСТАВРАЦИЯ ИЛИ МОРАЛЬНАЯ РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ?

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Аннотация. Продолжающаяся турбулентность в мировой политике сопровождается призывами заменить нынешний порядок международных отношений с модели мира, основанного на правилах, на модель многополярной системы, уходящей корнями в международное право. Политические лидеры и комментаторы, прежде всего российского происхождения, часто называли эти инициативы моральной революцией, призванной преобразовать нынешний мировой порядок. В данной статье рассматривается теологическая и философская подоплека идей, продвигающих такие изменения. В обсуждении утверждается, что эти предложения, хотя и звучат как революционные, перекликаются с авраамическими принципами международного диалога, разработанными средневековыми христианскими теологами, мыслителями Реформации, а также еврейскими и исламскими религиозными философами. В выводах подчеркивается, что современные приверженцы отказа от мира, основанного на правилах, прямо не ссылаются на религиозные доктрины, однако предлагаемые ими реформы и основные положения хорошо согласуются с этими более ранними этическими принципами. Это обобщение следует отнести к чисто научным, и оно вносит свой вклад в историю идей.

Ключевые слова: миропорядок, нравственная революция, глобализм, регионализм, Россия, Запад, религия, баланс сил, мир на основе правил, авраамическая теология.

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